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ONE STEP TOO FAR: THE SUPREME COURT
DENIES CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS THE
UNFETTERED USE OF THE PEREMPTORY
CHALLENGE IN GEORGIA V. McCOLLUM
I. INTRODUCTION
The jury system has long been recognized as an essential feature of criminal
trials.' As part of a criminal defendant's trial by jury, the peremptory
challenge functions to eliminate extremes of partiality amongst potential jurors,
and to assure the parties that the jurors will decide the case on the basis of the
evidence presented.2 In an attempt to combat racial discrimination, the
Supreme Court has attacked the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges.'
First, the Court prohibited a prosecutor from exercising peremptory challenges
in a discriminatory manner." Then, the Court denied civil litigants the right to
engage in the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges.'
Most recently, in Georgia v. McCollum,6 the Supreme Court denied the
criminal defendant the right to use the peremptory challenge in a discriminatory
manner, holding that such use violates the equal protection rights of excluded
jurors.' At best, the Court's decision in McCollum is a frustrated attempt to
solve the problems of racism in our society. At worst, the Court's decision
seriously undermines the criminal defendant's right to a fair trial. What is
certain from McCollum, though, is that the long-held and highly esteemed
procedural rights of the accused are now inferior to the right of potential jurors
to be protected from discrimination.
After a statement of the case in Part II, this Comment will explore the legal
background of McCollum in Part Ill.' Part IV will discuss the Supreme Court's
1. Duncanv. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968).
2. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965).
3. A peremptory challenge is a challenge without cause. The exercise of peremptory challenges
is by nature, therefore, discriminatory. For purposes of this comment, however, "discriminatory
exercise of peremptory challenge" means exercising those challenges in a racially discriminatory
manner.
4. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
5. See Edmonsonv. Leesville Concrete Co., I llS. Ct. 2077 (1991).
6. 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992).
7. Id. at 2359.
8. See infra notes 24-75 and accompanying text.
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disposition of McCollum.9 This Comment will then explore and critically
analyze the reasoning of the McCollum Court's decision. Specifically, Part V-A
critiques the Court's exaggerated concern with the right of potential jurors to sit
on a jury."0 Part V-B evaluates the Court's decision that a criminal defendant
is a state actor, and concludes that the Court unduly expanded the state action
doctrine and ignored prior principles of state action." Finally, in Part V-C,
the Comment explores the Court's determination that the prospective juror's
equal protection rights outweigh a criminal defendant's rights, and concludes that
the Court underestimated the value of the free use of peremptory challenges by
criminal defendants.'
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On August 10, 1990, the defendant was indicted and charged with
aggravated assault and simple battery. 3 The indictment alleged that the
defendant, who was white, had beaten two African Americans.' 4  The
prosecution moved to prohibit the defendant from exercising peremptory
challenges in a racially-discriminatory manner.' 5 According to the prosecution,
the defendant's counsel indicated an intent to use the twenty peremptory
challenges to exclude African Americans, in an attempt to seat an all-white
jury.
16
Invoking Batson v. Kentucky,'7 the Sixth Amendment, and the Georgia
State Constitution, the prosecution sought an order requiring the defendant to
articulate a race-neutral explanation for the peremptory challenges.'" The trial
judge denied the state's motion, reasoning that "neither Georgia nor federal law
prohibits criminal defendants from exercising peremptory strikes in a racially
discriminatory manner.""
On appeal,' the Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the trial court, noting
that Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co. 21 applied to private civil litigants, not
9. See infra notes 76-84 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 85-92 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 93-119 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 120-46 and accompanying text.




17. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
18. Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2351-52 (1992).
19. id. at 2352.
20. The issue was certified for immediate appeal to the Georgia Supreme Court. Id. at 2348.
21. 111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991). See infra notes 59-77 and accompanying text.
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criminal defendants.? In its opinion, the Georgia Supreme Court stated:
While it may be that the United States Supreme Court may, in another
case, prohibit a criminal defendant from exercising peremptory
challenges to exclude jurors on the basis of race, it has not yet done
so. Bearing in mind the long history of jury trials as an essential
element of the protection of human rights, this court declines to
diminish the free exercise of peremptory strikes by a criminal
defendant. 23
The United States Supreme Court granted the petition for a writ of
certiorari to decide whether a criminal defendant's use of the peremptory
challenge in a racially discriminatory manner violates the Equal Protection
Clause of the Constitution.
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND OF THE CASE
The Fourteenth Amendment, adopted in 1868, prohibits the states from
depriving persons "of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."'
The amendment further provides that no person can be denied the "equal
protection of the laws. "25 Just twelve years after the Fourteenth Amendment's
ratification, the Supreme Court used equal protection to regulate the jury
selection process.
In Strauder v. West Virginia,' the Court held that a West Virginia statute
making African-Americans ineligible for grand or petit jury service violated the
Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection guarantees.' Although the Court
did not face the question of whether a defendant has a "right to a grand or petit
jury composed in whole or in part of persons of his own race or color,"' it
did hold that persons of the defendant's race may not be excluded from the jury
22. State v. McCoiturn, 405 S.E.2d 688 (Ga. 1991), rev'd, Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct.
2348 (1992).
23. Id. at 689. Three justices dissented, arguing that the long line of United States Supreme
Court decisions establish that racially motivated peremptory strikes by a criminal defendant violate
the Constitution. Id. at 689-93.
24. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
25. Id.
26. 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
27. Id. at 305. (quoting 1872-1873 W. Va. Acts 102, which provides in pertinent part: "All
white male persons, who are twenty-one years of age, and who are citizens of this state, shall be
liable to serve as jurors, except as herein provided.").
"28. Id.
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by law solely because of their race or color." Since Strauder, the Court has
looked beyond the juror-qualification statutes and has found invalid the
implementation of facially neutral laws in a discriminatory manner.' As the
Court stated in McCollwn, "[o]ver the last century, in an almost unbroken chain
of decisions, this Court gradually has abolished race as a consideration for jury
service."31
In Swain v. Alabama,' the Court was directly confronted with the issue
of whether the discriminatory use of the peremptory challenge during petit jury
selection was subject to equal protection scrutiny. The prosecution in Swain
struck all six African Americans from the petit jury with peremptory challenges,
and the defendant argued that the petit jury was void because it was chosen in
a racially discriminatory way.33 On appeal, the United States Supreme Court
refused to hold that the Constitution requires an examination into the
prosecutor's reasons for the exercise of peremptory challenges in any given
case.3
The Court did, however, hold that systematic strikes of African American
veniremen raised a different issue.' Such a pattern, the Court stated, could
rise to the level of a prima facie case of a prosecutor denying African
29. Id. at 310. The Court also held that the exclusion of African American jurors violates the
African American defendant's right to equal protection, because: "[ilt is well known that prejudices
often exist against particular classes in the community, which may sway the judgment of jurors, and
which, therefore, operate in some cases to deny to persons of those classes the full enjoyment of that
protection which others enjoy." Id. at 309.
Some commentators have interpreted this statement as asserting that a white jury is not likely
to give a fair trial in many instances to an African American defendant. See, e.g., Albert Alschuler,
The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory Challenges, and the Review of Jury
Verdicts, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 153, 188-91 (1989); Douglas L. Colbert, Challenging the Challenge:
Thirteenth Amendment as a Prohibition Against the Racial Use of Peremptory Challenges, 76
CORNELL L. REV. 1, 124 (1990).
30. See, e.g., Hernandezv. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 478-79 (1954); Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S.
559, 561 (1953); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 589 (1935); Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339,
346-47 (1886); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370, 397 (1881).
31. Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2352 (1992).
32. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
33. Id. at 203. The trial judge overruled the defendant's objections, and the Alabama Supreme
Court subsequently affirmed. 156 So. 2d 368 (Ala. 1963).
34. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 222 (1965). According to the Court, once the challenge
stage of jury selection begins, African Americans are, like the "white, Protestant and Catholic ..
. subject to being challenged without cause." Id. at 221. The Court also examined the nature of
the peremptory challenge and concluded that "it is often exercised upon the 'sudden impressions and
unaccountable prejudices we are apt to conceive upon the bare looks and gestures of another.'" Id.
at 220 (citing Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 376 (1892)).
35. Swain, 380 U.S. at 223.
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Americans the right to serve on a jury.' Despite the fact, however, that "no
Negro ha[d] actually served on a petit jury" in Talladega County, Alabama, for
fourteen years," the Court held that no prima facie case of discrimination
existed, because the defendant failed to lay the proper foundation showing that
"the prosecutor alone" was responsible.'
In Batson v. Kentucky," the Supreme Court overruled Swain's evidentiary
standard for establishing a prima facie case of discrimination in petit jury
selection.' Batson involved a African American defendant's criminal trial,4
in which the prosecutor used his peremptory challenges to remove all four
African Americans on the venire, resulting in a jury composed entirely of
whites.42  On appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed the lower
state court decision. The Court held that a defendant may establish a prima
facie case of purposeful discrimination in selecting the petit jury solely on
evidence of the prosecutor's discriminatory use of peremptory challenges in that
particular case, even if no pattern of systemic exclusion across cases could be
shown.43
A substantial amount of Justice Powell's majority opinion in Batson
36. Id. The Court stated that an inference of purposeful discrimination would be raised if it
were shown that a prosecutor:
in case after case, whatever the circumstances, whatever the crime and whoever the
defendant or the victim may be, is responsible for the removal of Negroes who have
been selected as qualified jurors by the jury commissioners and who have survived
challenges for cause, with the result that no Negroes ever served on petit juries.
Id.
37. Id. at 205.
38. Id. at 224. The burden of laying this foundation was quite high. Indeed, only two claims
have successfully established a prima facie case of discrimination: State v. Brown, 371 So. 2d 751
(La. 1979), and State v. Washington, 375 So. 2d 1162 (La. 1979).
39. 476 U.S. 79, 80 (1986).
40. See Jonathan B. Mintz, Note, Batson v. Kentucky: A Half Step in the Right Direction
(Racial Discrimination and Peremptory Challenges Under the Heavier Confines of Equal Protection).
72 CORNELL L. REv. 1026, 1031 (1987).
41. Batson, 476 U.S. at 82.
42. Id. at 82-83. The trial judge rejected the arguments of the defense counsel that the removal
of all African Americans denied the defendant equal protection of the law under the Fourteenth
Amendment and denied him the right to a jury drawn from a cross section of the community. Id.
at 83.
On appeal to the Kentucky Supreme Court, Batson largely abandoned his Fourteenth
Amendment equal protection challenge and relied heavily on his Sixth Amendment argument that
he was deprived of his constitutional right to an impartial jury drawn from a cross section of the
community. Id. at 84-85. The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the decision of the trial court,
basing its decision on Swain v. Alabama. Id. at 84.
43. Id. at 96.
AA
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discussed how an equal protection violation may be proven." If the defendant
makes a prima facie showing of purposeful discrimination, the burden shifts to
the prosecution to rebut the defendant's case.' The prosecution must come
forward with a neutral explanation for the peremptory strike that is "related to
the particular case to be tried."' The Court explicitly refused to detail any
specific procedures to be followed by a trial court upon a defendant's objection
to a peremptory challenge.47 Instead, the Court left the specific implementation
of the Batson procedures to lower state and federal courts. 4
The Court also declined to decide whether a criminal defendant's
discriminatory use of peremptory challenges is similarly limited.' In his
dissent, however, Chief Justice Burger posed the rhetorical question: "Once the
Court has held that prosecutors are limited in their use of peremptory
challenges, could we rationally hold that defendants are not?"'
44. To establish a prima facie case of discrimination, the defendant must first show membership
in a cognizable racial group and that the prosecutor exercised peremptory challenges to exclude
members of the defendant's race from the petit jury. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96 (1986).
Second, the defendant may rely on the fact that peremptory challenges constitute a jury selection
practice that provides an opportunity to discriminate. Id. Finally, the burden remains on the
defendant alleging the discriminatory selection practice to show that the circumstances surrounding
the use of the prosecutor's challenges create an inference that the prosecutor used peremptory
challenges to exclude jurors on the basis of race. Id. This inference of purposeful exclusion, the
Court noted, could arise from a pattern of conduct by the prosecutor or from questions and
statements made by the prosecutor during voir dire. Id. at 96-97.
It has been subsequently held, however, that the mere fact that the prosecution used a
peremptory challenge to exclude an African American venirperson does not create the inference of
purposeful discrimination. See, e.g., United States v. Lewis, 837 F.2d 415, 417 (9th Cir. 1988);
United States v. Porter, 831 F.2d 760, 767-68 (8th Cir. 1987); United States v. Vaccaro, 816 F.2d
443, 457 (9th Cir. 1987).
45. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97.
46. Id. The striking of one minority juror for racial reasons has been held to violate the Equal
Protection Clause even if the striking of other minority jurors is justified by race neutral reasons.
See, e.g., Splunge v. Clark, 960 F.2d 705 (7th Cir. 1992); United States v. Battle, 836 F.2d 1084
(8th Cir. 1987).
47. Batson, 476 U.S. at 99.
48. Id. at 99 n.24. Some commentators have criticized the lack of precise rules or procedures
governing Batson challenges as so time consuming that Congress is likely to completely remove the
peremptory challenge from our justice system. See, e.g., William T. Pizzi, Batson v. Kentucky:
Curing the Disease but Killing the Patient, Sup. CT. REV. 97, 119 (1987) (arguing that Batson will
unduly hamper the litigation process); David M. Kaston, Comment, Vitiation of Peremptory
Challenge in Civil Actions: Clark v. City of Bridgeport, 61 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 155 (1986) (arguing
that Batson should not be extended and that the Court should adhere to the stricter Swain criteria).
49. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 n.12 (1986).
50. Id. at 126. But see infra notes 122-47 and accompanying text for an answer in the
affirmative. Justice Marshall went a step further. He argued that peremptory strikes should be
abolished altogether. Id. at 103 (Marshall, J., concurring). He argued that the Court's decision
would not end racial discrimination in the exercise of peremptory challenges. Id. That goal,
according to Justice Marshall, could only be accomplished by completely eliminating peremptory
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In Powers v. Ohio,"' the Supreme Court held that a white criminal
defendant has standing to raise the equal protection objection to a prosecutor's
allegedly race-based exercise of peremptory challenges to exclude prospective
African American jurors.3 2 In its holding, the Court maintained that the
criminal defendant could assert the excluded juror's equal protection rights under
principles of third-party standing.' The Powers majority did not discuss the
claim that the practice of race-based peremptory challenges violates the
defendant's own right to equal protection. Instead, it granted relief on the
theory that race-based jury selection violates the equal protection rights of the
excluded jurors.' The fact that the defendant's race differed from that of the
juror was irrelevant, according to the Court, since "the utility of the peremptory
challenge system must be accommodated to the command of racial
neutrality. "'
In the dissent in Holland v. Illinois, Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, rejected the right of a white defendant to assert these rights as an
unwarranted and dangerous expansion of the Court's decision in Batson:
Not only does this [decision] exceed the rationale of Batson, but it
exceeds Batson's emotional and symbolic justification as well ....
I am unmoved, and I think most Americans would be, by this white
defendant's complaint that he was sought to be tried by an all-white
jury or that he should be permitted to press black jurors' unlodged
complaint that they were not allowed to sit in judgment of him.s
After Batson and Powers, it was inevitable that the courts would face the
question of whether a civil litigant's use of the peremptory challenge in a
racially discriminatory way implicates the equal protection clause.57 Unlike a
challenges. Id. at 102-03.
51. 111S. Ct. 1364 (1991).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 1370-73.
54. This result was foreshadowed by the Court's decision in Holland v. Illinois, wherein five
justices stated that they would, if the issue presented itself, recognize the right of a white defendant
to assert the equal protection rights of excluded African American jurors. See Holland v. Illinois,
493 U.S. 474, 488 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 490 (Marshall, J., dissenting)(opinion
joined by Justices Brennan and Blackmun); id. at 504 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
55. Powers, 111 S. Ct. at 1373.
56. Holland, 493 U.S. at 434.
57. See Michael N. Chesney and Gerard T. Gallagher, Note, State Action and the Peremptory
Chalenge: Evolution of the Court's Treament and Implications for Georgia v. McCollum, 67
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1049, 1055 (1992).
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criminal trial--such as in Batson--where the prosecutor is easily identifiable as
a state actor, the use of peremptory challenges in a civil trial raises the more
difficult question of whether state action is present.'
The Supreme Court resolved this question in Edmonson v. Leesville
Concrete Co." In Edmonson, an African American man brought a negligence
action against a construction company.' Two of the three jurors struck by the
defendant were African American, and all of the jurors struck by the plaintiff
were white.6 The plaintiff challenged the defendant's peremptory strikes
under Batson, and requested that the district court require the defendant to
articulate a race-neutral reason for striking the two African American jurors.62
The judge denied the request and held that Batson does not apply in civil
proceedings.'
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that a civil litigant who
uses a peremptory challenge to remove a juror on the basis of race violates the
juror's equal protection rights.' To determine whether the race-based
58. The constitutional protections against infringement of individual liberty and equal protection
apply in general only to action by the government. See National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v.
Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179 (1988). Even blatantly discriminatory private conduct does not violate
constitutionally guaranteed equal protection rights. See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419
U.S. 345, 349 (1974). Thus, the finding of state action is generally a prerequisite to the finding of
a constitutional violation.
Some lower federal courts considered the issue of whether a civil litigant's use of the
peremptory challenge constitutes state action and disagreed on whether state action was present. See
Dunham v. Frank's Nursery & Craft's, Inc., 919 F.2d 1281 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that a private
litigant is a state actor for the purpose of a Bauon challenge), ceri. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2797 (1991);
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 895 F.2d 218 (5th Cir. 1990) (en banc) (holding that there
was no state action in the exercise of peremptory challenges by private litigants), rev'd, 111 S. Ct.
2077 (1991).
59. 1ll S. Ct. 2077 (1991).
60. Id. at 2080.
61. Id. at 2081.
62. Id.
63. Id. As impaneled, the jury included eleven white persons and one African American
person. Id.
64. Edmonsonv. Leesville Concrete Co., I lIS. Ct. 2077, 2088 (1991). The equal protection
component of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause applies to the excluded jurors in federal
court. The Fifth Amendment provides:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on
a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval
forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger; nor
shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or
limb, nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor
be deprived of life, liberty,or property, without the due process of law; nor shall private
property be taken without just compensation.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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peremptory challenges at issue were within the realm of state action, the
Edmonson Court employed the two-part test set forth in Lugar v. Edmondson Oil
Co. 5  In addressing the first part of the test, whether the constitutional
deprivation was caused by the exercise of a state-created right or privilege, the
Court found that the peremptory challenge easily meets this prong because it is
a statutorily-created device.'
The second part of the test, whether the party charged with the deprivation
may be fairly said to be a state actor, led the Court to consider three factors: (1)
whether the actor relied on state assistance and benefits;67 (2) whether the actor
performed a traditional state function;' and (3) whether the injury was
aggravated in a unique way by the incident of state authority.' In considering
these factors, the Court found, first, that the government's significant
involvement in the jury selection process made it possible for private parties to
exercise peremptory challenges.' Second, the Court held that the selection of
jurors was a unique state function delegated in part to private litigants.7' Thus,
discrimination in the selection ofjurors resulted from government delegation and
participation.' Finally, the Court noted that the government's active
participation in the jury selection process serves to aggravate the injury of
discrimination.'
65. See Lugar v. EdmondsonOil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982). Lugar was the lessee-operator of
a truckstop, and Edmondson was one of his suppliers. Id. at 924. Edmondson sued Lugar under
§ 1983, alleging deprivation of property without due process of law. Id. at 925. The district court
held that there was no state action. Id. at 925. The Fourth Circuit affirmed. Id.
On appeal, the Supreme Court held that joint action with a state official to accomplish a
prejudgment deprivation of a constitutionally protected property interest will support a claim against
a private party. Id. at 928. The Court then addressed the proper standard for determining whether
or not state action exists. The Court stated that the proper inquiry is whether "the conduct allegedly
causing the deprivation of a federal right (is) fairly attributable to the State." Id. at 937. The Court
stated that this inquiry has two parts:
First, the deprivation must be caused by the exercise of some right or privilege created
by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by the state or by a person for whom the
State is responsible. Second, the party charged with the deprivation must be a person
who may fairly be said to be a state actor. This may be because he is a state official,
because he has acted together with or has obtained significant aid from state officials,
or because his conduct is otherwise chargeable to the state.
Id.
66. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2083 (1991).
67. Id. at 2084.
68. Id. at 2085.
69. Id. at 2087.
70. Id. at 2084. The Court noted that, in the federal system, Congress has statutorily provided
for the qualifications of jurors, as well as the procedure for their selection. Id.
71. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2087 (1991).
72. Id.
73. Id.
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Having found state action, the final issue before the Court was whether a
private litigant had standing to raise the equal protection rights of the excluded
jurors. Relying on Powers,74 the Court held that a private litigant could assert
the rights of the excluded juror. 5
IV. THE SUPREME COURT DISPosrrION OF GEORGL4 v. McCoLUM
In McCollum, the issue was whether criminal defendants can use
peremptory challenges in a discriminatory manner. Despite the fact that the
Court in Edmondson recently had found state action present in a civil
defendant's discriminatory use of a peremptory challenge,76 the question of
whether a criminal defendant's discriminatory use of the peremptory challenge
violates the Equal Protection Clause remained unanswered." In a majority
opinion authored by Mr. Justice Blackmun, the Court held that the Constitution
prohibits criminal defendants from exercising peremptory challenges in a racially
discriminatory manner.' In deciding whether the Constitution prohibits race-
based peremptory challenges, the Court stated that it must ask four questions:
First, whether a criminal defendant's exercise of peremptory
challenges in a racially discriminatory manner inflicts the harms
addressed by Batson. Second, whether the exercise of peremptory
challenges by a criminal defendant constitutes state action. Third,
whether prosecutors have standing to raise the constitutional challenge.
And fourth, whether the constitutional rights of a criminal defendant
nonetheless preclude the extension of [Supreme Court] precedents to
this case.Y9
74. See supra notes 51-57 and accompanying text.
75. Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2087-88. To overcome the general rule that a litigant cannot base
a claim on the legal rights of a third party, the Court stated:
[A] litigant may raise a claim on behalf of a third party if the litigant can demonstrate
that he or she has suffered a concrete, redressable injury, that he or she has a close
relation with the third party, and that there exists some hindrance to the third party's
ability to protect his or her own interests. All three of these requirements for third party
standing were held satisfied in the criminal context, and they are satisfied in the civil
context as well.
Id. at 2087.
76. See supra notes 59-75 and accompanying text.
77. This issue has received attention in the lower courts. Several states have held that a
criminal defendant's discriminatory use of peremptory challenges violates their state constitutions.
See, e.g., People v. Wheeler, 583 P.2d 748 (Cal. 1978); State v. Neil, 457 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1984);
State v. Levinson, 795 P.2d 845 (Haw. 1990); Commonwealth v. Soares, 387 N.E.2d 499 (Mass.
1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979); State v. Alverado, 534 A.2d 440 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law
Div. 1987); People v. Kern, 555 N.Y.S.2d 647 (N.Y. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 77 (1990).
78. Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2359 (1992).
79. Id.
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In considering these factors, the Court found, first, that the harm of
subjecting the juror to public discrimination is the same whether the state or
defense inflicts it, and therefore the harm is the same as that in Batson.'
Second, the Court held that the exercise of peremptory challenges by a criminal
defendant constitutes state action, because peremptory challenges are established
by statute or decisional law, and a private party can be characterized as a state
actor. s  Third, the Court found that prosecutors have standing to raise an equal
protection challenge on behalf of excluded jurors.' Finally, the Court held
that the constitutional rights of a criminal defendant did not preclude an
extension of Batson.' The Court, therefore, concluded that the criminal
defendant's use of peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory manner
was unconstitutional."
V. ANALYSIS
Although the Court may have improved the perception of juries with some
members of the public, the McColl= decision is wrong. The Court has simply
decided that the fundamental and long-held rights of criminal defendants are less
important than the right of citizens to sit on juries. Having decided this, the
Court wrongly characterized criminal defendants as state actors when exercising
peremptory challenges. This wide expansion of state actor status ignores
important qualities of the criminal defendant that separate him from other
litigants and that makes his use of the peremptory challenge, even if based on
racial stereotypes, justifiable.
80. Id. at 2358. See infra notes 85-92 and accompanying text.
81. Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2359 (1992). See infra notes 93-119 and
accompanying text.
82. Id. See infra note 120.
83. Id. at 2358-59. See infra notes 120-146 and accompanying text.
84. Chief Justice Rehnquist filed a concurring opinion in which he maintained that the Court's
decision in Edmondson was wrongly decided but, because that decision remains the law and
therefore controls the McColun decision, he joined the opinion of the Court. Id. at 2359.
Justice Thomas also concurred, expressing concern that the decision, "while protecting jurors,
leaves defendants with less means of protecting themselves." Id. at 2360. He also noted that the
Court's decision "has taken [the Court] down a slope of inquiry that has no clear stopping point."
Id.
Two Justices dissented. Justice O'Connor, in her dissent, argued that the majority's finding
of state action was incorrectly decided. She stated that "our decisions specifically establish that
criminal defendants and their lawyers are not government actors when they perform traditional trial
functions." Id. at 2361.
Further, Justice Scalia dissented, agreeing with Justice O'Connor that state action is not
present when a criminal defendant exercises peremptory challenges. Id. at 2364-65.
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A. The Harms Addressed by Batson
To satisfy itself that a racially motivated use of the peremptory challenge
by criminal defendants violates the equal protection rights of excluded jurors,
the majority in McCollum first asked whether the criminal defendant's exercise
of peremptory challenges based on race inflicts the same harms as addressed by
Batson.Y5 The Court initially recognized that Batson was designed to further
many goals, "only one of which was to protect individual defendants from
discrimination in the selection of jurors."" By focusing on the protection of
the excluded juror, as the Court had done in Batson, as well as in Edmondson
and Powers, the Court was able to conclude that "[r]egardless of who invokes
the discriminatory challenge, there can be no doubt that the harm is the
same.",7
Focusing attention on the rights of the excluded jurors, as the Court has
done since Batson, has some value. Removing racial discrimination from the
justice system, for instance, is undoubtedly an important goal toward which the
Supreme Court should and does aspire. In extending the holding in Batson to
criminal defendants, however, the Court places the potential juror's right not to
be racially stereotyped above vital procedural rights of the accused.'
Perhaps equally dangerous, though, is the McCollum Court's apparent
attempt to cater to public opinion with its decision.' The Court's concern with
85. Id. at 2353.
86. Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2353 (1992) (citation omitted). Although the
defendant in Batson asserted his own rights, the Court later noted in its holding that the rights of the
excluded juror were also implicated:
Racial discrimination in selection of jurors harms not only the accused whose life or
liberty they are summoned to try. Competence to serve as a juror ultimately depends
on an assessment of individual qualifications and ability impartially to consider evidence
at trial . . . [and a]s long ago as Strauder, therefore, the Court recognized that by
denying a person participation in jury service on account of his race, the State
unconstitutionally discriminated against the excluded juror.
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 87 (1986) (citations omitted).
87. McCollum, 112S. Ct. at 2353.
88. See infra notes 120-46 and accompanying text.
89. There is much evidence that the concerns of society are beginning to outweigh the right of
the accused to a fair trial. For instance, Alex Kozinski (Oudge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit) points out that there are strains in our case law that allow the rights of others to be
considered in trials; the right of the press to cover a trial; and the gradual expansion of Batson to
give members of the venire the right not to be racially excluded from jury service. See Darlene
Ricker, Holding Out, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1992, at 51.
Other evidence exists that our justice system is being held hostage to political behavior. For
instance, in the retrial of a Miami police officer charged with manslaughter in the deaths of two
African American men, Dade County Circuit Judge W. Thomas Spencer cited the "Rodney King
verdict" in ordering a change of venue, hoping that such a change would improve the odds that
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racial discrimination did not cease with excluded jurors, but extended to the
community as a whole. This concern is clearly evident in McCollum, as the
Court found:
Mhe harm from discriminatory jury selection extends beyond that
inflicted on the . .. excluded juror to touch the entire community
• . . [T]he need for public confidence is especially high in cases
involving race-related crimes .... Public confidence in the integrity
of the criminal justice system is essential for preserving community
peace in trials involving race-related crimes.'
Thus, in an attempt to improve public perceptions of our justice system, the
Court severely weakened the peremptory challenge, an essential device for the
criminal defendant's fair trial." Unlike Batson, though, in which the Court
took the peremptory challenge away from the state to eliminate racial
discrimination, the Court in McCollum unfairly placed the burden of eradicating
racial discrimination upon the criminal defendant. Moreover, the Court seemed
to entirely neglect the fact that it is the accused who has much to lose,
sometimes even his life.' Improving racial relations in American society is
unquestionably necessary to our success as a nation. Neglecting vital procedural
African Americans would be seated on the jury. See Mark Hansen, Different Jury, Different
Verdict?, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1992, at 54.
In a Washington, D.C. civil trial alleging police use of excessive force, Superior Court Judge
Michael Rankin allowed jurors to take a day off from their deliberations to participate in a protest
of the "Rodney King verdict." Id. Note that even the phrase "Rodney King verdict" reveals the
political focus of trials. In reality its proper name is People v. Powell, et al. Id.
Lawmakers in New Jersey and California have proposed legislation designed to avoid a repeat
of the rioting that followed the acquittal of the police officers who beat Rodney King by requiring,
for the first time, that demographics be taken into account in any decision to change a trial's venue.
Id. at 55.
Finally, under a bill introduced in the New Jersey legislature, a judge who decides to move
a trial would be required to select a new venue with the same racial, ethnic, and socioeconomic
characteristics as the original site. Id.
90. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2353 (citation omitted).
91. As Justice Scalia aptly points out:
In the interest of promoting the supposedly greater good of race relations in the society
as a whole (make no mistake that this is what underlies all of this), we use the
Constitution to destroy the age-old right of criminal defendants to exercise peremptory
challenges as they wish, to secure a jury that they consider fair.
Id. at 2365 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
92. See Katherine Goldwasser, Limiting A Criminal Defendant's Use ofPerempwry Challenges:
On Symmetry and the Jury in a Criminal Trial, 102 HARv. L. REv. 808, 837 (1989) (stating that
a prohibition against race-based peremptory challenges does not jeopardize the procedural fairness
of trials from the prosecutors point of view. For defendants, however, those limitations would
impair the ability to establish a defense free from state interference and would mean that a
defendant's role in the jury selection process would no longer be consonant with his or her personal
stake in the jury's decision.).
-- AA
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rights of criminal defendants, however, is the wrong way to reach that goal.
B. State Action
The second question that the McCollum Court asked in order to find an
equal protection violation in a criminal defendant's discriminatory use of the
peremptory challenge was whether state action exists."3 When approaching
the question of whether the state's involvement with a private party constitutes
state action, the Court has struggled unsuccessfully to fashion a meaningful
standard. 4 Professors Nowak and Rotunda have suggested that the Court will
not find state action when it deems the challenged practice compatible with the
Fourteenth Amendment, but will find state action when it finds that the harm to
protected rights outweighs the value of the challenged practice." Considering
the emphasis placed on the rights of potential jurors not to be racially
stereotyped, the Court's finding of state action may not be so surprising.
Nonetheless, the Court's decision that a criminal defendant's use of peremptory
challenges constitutes state action is, as Justice O'Connor described it, "a
remarkable conclusion."96
As it did in Edmonson, the Court employed the two-prong analysis of Lugar
v. Edmondson Oil to determine whether state action existed.' The Court held
that the first prong, whether the alleged deprivation has resulted from the
exercise of a right or privilege having its source in state authority, was
satisfied." The Court maintained that, since the state provided the peremptory
challenge, "there can be no question" that the challenges satisfy Lugar's first
93. Although the Court's burden of finding state action in the context of McCoum may have
been eased somewhat by its recent decision in Edmonson, the conclusion that a criminal defendant
was a state actor was not at all certain. See Goldwasser, supra note 92, at 820 (stating that the
adversarial relationship between the state and the defendant in criminal cases compels the conclusion
that a defendant's use of peremptory challenges is not state action). But see Chesney & Gallagher,
supra note 57, at 1077 (maintaining that the Court should find state action in a criminal defendant's
use of peremptory challenges).
94. The Court has formulated several tests for determining when private conduct is attributable
to the state, but has also recognized that these tests may be nothing more than "different ways of
characterizing the necessarily fact-bound (state action) inquiry." Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457
U.S. 922, 939 (1982). This case-by-case analysis basically amounts to determining whether there
is a sufficient quantum of state connections to a particular activity to subject that activity to the
strictures of the Fourteenth Amendment, even though that activity is performed by a private party.
See JOHN NOWAK & RONALD ROTUNDA, CONsTrrUTIONAL LAw 483 (4th ed. 1991). [Hereinafter
NOWAK & ROTUNDA].
95. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 94, at 485.
96. McCollum v. Georgia, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2361 (1992) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
97. See supra note 65 for a description of the Lugar test.
98. McCoUum, 112 S. Ct. at 2354.
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prong. 9
9
The second prong of the Lugar test requires that "the private party charged
with the deprivation [of constitutional rights] can be described as a state
actor." " Just as in Edmonson, the second prong required a lengthier
analysis. The Court identified three factors to determine whether Lugar's
second prong was satisfied.''
The Court's analysis of the first factor, the extent to which the actor relies
on governmental assistance and benefits, was brief. The Court stated that a
criminal defendant relies on "governmental assistance and benefits" as much as
a civil litigant does."° Because Edmonson held that a civil litigant sufficiently
relies on governmental assistance and benefits enough to constitute state action,
the majority in McCollum concluded that a criminal defendant's exercise of a
peremptory challenge similarly constitutes state action. 103
The conclusory manner in which the Court found this factor satisfied is
troubling. The tremendous stake that a criminal defendant has in his own trial
should have given the Court reason to pause and re-examine the assistance and
benefits factor. Moreover, the decision in Edmonson with respect to this factor
was arguably incorrectly decided."I) As Justice Scalia aptly pointed out in his
99. Id. at 2354-55.
100. Id. at 2355. Interestingly, the second prong was phrased differently in Lugar. It read:
"whether the private party charged with the deprivation could be described appropriately and in all
fairness as a state actor." Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., Ill S. Ct. 2077, 2091 (1991)
(citation omitted) (emphasis added). Not surprisingly, Justice O'Connor reminded the Court of this
in her dissent when she noted that "[wihat our cases require, and what the Court neglects, is a
realistic appraisal of the relationship between defendants and the government that has brought them
to trial." McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2361 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
101. See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
102. Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2355 (1992).
103. Id.
104. The Court in Edmonson cited Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715
(1961), for support that a private lawyer is a state actor, yet Burton is clearly distinguishable.
Burton involved a restaurant on state property that admitted only white persons. Id. at 716. The
restaurant received rent from the restaurant operator, who leased it from the state. Id. at 720. The
Court held that the restaurant operator could be fairly characterized as a state actor. Id. at 725.
Clearly, in this situation a restaurant operator who earns much, if not all, of his livelihood from a
state-owned business is assisted by and benefits from his contract with the state.
The assistance and benefits an attorney and his client receive from the state, however, are
distinguishable. An attorney and client do receive some benefits from the state, including the
peremptory challenge. These benefits, however, are broad, and result from a procedure designed
to benefit the entire justice system. In contrast, the benefit and assistance that the restaurant operator
received from the state in Burton was much greater.
Justice O'Connor recognized this in her dissent in Edmonson, where she pointed out that
"[diespite the fact that the courthouse and its procedures are inseparable from the practice of law,
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dissent, "a bad decision should not be followed logically to its illogical
conclusion. ""os
The Court found that the second factor, whether the actor is performing a
traditional governmental function, is satisfied by a criminal defendant's use of
a peremptory challenge."o The Court noted that, in the context of a criminal
defendant, this is especially the case. "° This is so, according to the Court,
"because the selection of a jury in a criminal case fulfills a unique and
constitutionally compelled governmental function. ""0
The Court's analysis of the second factor dangerously broadens the concept
of traditional governmental function. The government and criminal defendant
are adversaries, and the principle function of a criminal jury in our system has
always been to provide "a defense against arbitrary law enforcement." "
Justice O'Connor reminded the Court of this in her dissent in Edmonson, when
she stated that "challenges are not a traditional governmental function; the
tradition is one of unguided private choice." m' Nevertheless, the Court in
McCollum chose to focus on the tradition of government's selection of juries,
rather than the long tradition of protecting the procedural rights of the accused.
Thus, the McCollum majority unfairly widened the concept of traditional
governmental function to encompass a criminal defendant's use of peremptory
challenges.
Finally, the Court considered a third factor, asking whether the injury was
aggravated in some unique way by the incidents of government authority."'
The Court found this factor easily satisfied because the courtroom setting, as it
found in Edmonson, "intensifies the harmful effects of the private litigant's
discriminatory act."'12
Despite the satisfaction of the Lugar test, the Court was faced with the task
of reconciling the decision that state action exists in McCollum with the earlier
decision of Polk County v. Dodson,"3 in which the Court held that a public
riding a bus is not converted into state action merely because the government has built the road and
provided public transportation." Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2090
(1991) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
105. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2365.
106. Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2355 (1992).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Duncanv. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968).
110. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2093 (1991).
111. Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2356 (1992).
112. Id.
113. 454 U.S. 312 (1981).
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defender was not a state actor when engaged in adversarial functions." 4 The
Court distinguished Polk County by stating that "[tihe exercise of a peremptory
challenge differs significantly from other action taken in support of a defendant's
defense. In exercising a peremptory challenge, a criminal defendant is wielding
the power to chose a quintessential governmental body--indeed, the institution
of government is one upon which our judicial system depends.""5
The best that can be said about the Court's finding of state action in light
of its prior precedent is that it requires some "deft maneuvering."1
6
Certainly, it is a decision that, as Justice O'Connor notes, "simply cannot be
squared with [the Court's decision in Polk County]."" 7  The Court's state
action analysis in McCollum, moreover, should raise serious concerns. The
concept of state action is a fundamental principle that defines the limit of the
Constitution and separates the private sphere from the government. In
McCollum, the majority unduly expands the state action doctrine by failing to
recognize the private nature of a criminal defendant. The precedential effects
that this expansion will have on state action theory will likely be troublesome.
Even more dangerous, though, is the immediate effect that will surely be felt by
criminal defendants. The criminal defendant and prosecution are adversaries,
and the accused has, therefore, traditionally been given procedural safeguards
considered essential to a fair trial."' Most notable of these protections is the
peremptory challenge." 9
114. Polk County, 454 U.S. at 318. The issue in Polk County was whether a public defender
acts "under color of state law." Id. at 314. The Court found that a public defender functions as
an adversary of the state in a criminal trial. Id. at 320. Thus, the Court could not find any "color
of state law" in the public defender's adversarial functions. Id. Despite this, however, the Court
did leave open the possibility that a public defender "would act under color of state law while
performing certain administrative and possibly investigative functions." Id. at 325. See also Tower
v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914, 920 (1983) (stating that "[aippointed counsel in a state criminal
prosecution. . . does not act 'under color of' state law in the normal course of conducting the
defense.").
115. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2356.
116. One commentator has noted that "McCollum continues the tradition of reading Batson
broadly even if that means engaging in some deft maneuvering to find the constitutional requirement
of 'state action' in the activities of the criminal defense bar." Stephanie B. Goldberg, Batson and
the Straight-Face Test, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1992, at 82.
117. Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2362 (1992)(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
118. See infra notes 120-46 and accompanying text.
119. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
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C. Rights of the Oiminal Defendant
The Court's fourth and final inquiry"s was whether the interests served
by Batson must give way to the rights of a criminal defendant.' 2' Initially, the
Court noted that the right to exercise peremptory challenges is not a
constitutionally protected fundamental right, but rather "one state-created means
to the constitutional end of an impartial jury and fair trial."'2 The Court then
considered three specific rights of the criminal defendant: first, the right to a
fair trial; second, the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel;
and third, the Sixth Amendment right to a trial by an impartial jury."= The
Court concluded that prohibiting the use of peremptory challenges in a racially
discriminatory way does not violate these rights.'2 '
First, the Court decided that denying a criminal defendant the use of
racially-motivated peremptory challenges would not undermine a defendant's
right to a fair trial.' The Court retreated from this conclusion, though,
because it then stated: "nonetheless, 'if race stereotypes are the price for
acceptance of a jury panel as fair,' we reaffirm today that such a 'price is too
high to meet the standard of the Constitution. ""2 Thus, the Court did not
really wish to preserve a criminal defendant's right to a fair trial, which the
unfettered use of the peremptory challenge secures. Rather, the Court simply
120. The Court's third inquiry was whether the prosecution has third party standing to raise the
rights of the excluded juror. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2357. Because the issue of third party
standing was settled in Powers, the Court in McCollum did not expand or modify the law in this
area. Thus, only brief mention will be made of the Court's analysis.
The McCollum Court applied the same three-part test which had been applied in Edmonson
and Powers. The test asks: first, whether the litigant can demonstrate that he or she has suffered
a concrete injury; second, whether the litigant has a close relation to the third party; and third,
whether there exists some hindrance to the third party's ability to protect its own interests.
McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2357.
The Court found the first part of the test satisfied because the state suffers an injury when the
integrity of the judicial process is undermined by the exercise of discriminatory peremptory
challenges. Id. Second, the state has a close relation to potential jurors because the state represents
its citizens. Id. Finally, the Court found that the third part of the test was satisfied because the
barriers to a lawsuit by an excluded juror are formidable. Id.
121. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2357-58.
122. Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2358 (1992). However, the Court also stated that
in Swain, it recognized the "long and widely held belief that the peremptory challenge is a necessary
part of trial by jury." Id. (quoting Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965)). In Edmonson,
the Court also recognized that "the role of litigants in determining the jury's composition provides
one reason for wide acceptance of the jury system and of its verdicts." Edmonson v. Leesville
Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2090 (1991).
123. Id. at 2358.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2358 (1992) (citation omitted).
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decided that there can be no discrimination on the basis of race in the use of
peremptory challenges, regardless of any adverse effects that this decision might
have on criminal defendants.
There can be no doubt that removing racial discrimination from our justice
system is a praiseworthy goal. Thus, the Court's decision in Batson denying the
State the right to use peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory manner
is correct, and was long overdue. The decision in McCollwn, though, is flawed
because it fails to take into account the unique qualities of a criminal defendant
that make his or her use of the peremptory challenge, even if based on race,
justifiable. Moreover, considering what is at stake for the accused, eliminating
a fundamental procedural protection, such as the peremptory challenge, should
have given the Court reason to hesitate.'"
History illustrates that the purpose behind granting criminal defendants the
right to trial by jury was "to prevent oppression by the government. " 2s A
part of this right traditionally includes the peremptory challenge, which "has
long been recognized primarily as a device to protect defendants. " '
Therefore, early statutes granted peremptory challenges only to defendants, and
even today many jurisdictions still allow a greater number to the defense. "0
The functions of the peremptory challenge also explain why its use by
criminal defendants is justified, even when based on racial stereotypes. First,
the peremptory challenge is necessary to "eliminate extremes of partiality on
both Sides. " 3  Furthermore, the peremptory challenge is of critical
importance to the criminal defendant because of the way the challenge gives
effect to a criminal defendant's personal reaction to those who might decide his
127. As Justice Thomas stated: "In effect, we have exalted the right of citizens to sit on juries
over the rights of the criminal defendant, even though it is the defendant, not the jurors, who faces
imprisonment or even death. At a minimum, I think that this inversion of priorities should give us
pause." Id. at 2360 (concurring opinion).
128. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155 (1968). See also Patton v. United States, 281
U.S. 276 (1930), where the Court observed that "[tlhe record of English and Colonial jurisprudence
antedating the Constitution will be searched in vain for evidence that trial by jury in criminal cases
was regarded as part of the structure of government, as distinguished from a right or privilege of
the accused." Id. at 296.
129. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 242 (1965) (Goldberg, J., dissenting). See also 4
WILLAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 353 (stating "in criminal cases, or at least in capital ones,
there is... allowed to the prisoner an arbitrary and capricious species of challenge.., which is
called a peremptory challenge; a provision full of that tenderness and humanity to prisoners."
(citation omitted)). See also Goldwasser, supra note 92.
130. JON M. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECLON PROCEDURES 145, 282-84 (1977) (listing 15 states
that allow the defense more peremptory challenges than the prosecution in all felony prosecutions
and no states that allow the prosecution more peremptories).
131. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965). See generally Goldwasser, supra note 92.
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or her case. 32 Professor Goldwasser notes that giving effect to such personal
reactions as "dislike" may not be compatible with our notions of justice, but
only where the prosecution is concerned.' 3 For the defendant, Goldwasser
maintains, everything about a criminal trial is intensely personal, and giving
effect to a defendant's personal reaction acknowledges this unique personal stake
in the outcome.' 34
The Supreme Court has clearly recognized the importance of allowing
peremptory challenges by the defendant. In Lewis v. United States,"3 the
Court stated that "[t]he right of the peremptory challenge comes from the
common law with the trial by jury itself, and has always been held essential to
the fairness of trial by jury. " "
The Court also considered the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to the
effective assistance of counsel. 37 The Court decided, however, that this right
was not violated because "counsel can ordinarily explain the reasons for
peremptory challenges without revealing anything about the trial strategy or any
confidential client communications."" The Court's treatment of this right
clearly departs from prior cases that more fully protected a criminal defendant's
right to effective assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court recognized the
importance of this right in Weatherford v. Bursey, " when it stated that "the
Sixth Amendment's assistance of counsel guarantee can be meaningfully
implemented only if a criminal defendant knows that his communications with
his attorney are private and that his lawful preparations for trial are secure
against intrusion by the government, his adversary in the criminal
proceeding. " 1
132. See Goldwasser, supra note 92, at 829. Professor Goldwasser describes this function as
an intuitive reaction, for which the best word might be "dislike." Id. Dislike may result from a
belief that a potential juror favors the other side, or is biased against one's own side. Id. At other
times, however, it may be wholly unexplainable except by saying "I do not like (or feel comfortable
with) that person." Id. See also BLACKSTONE, supra note 129, at 353 (stating "how necessary it




135. 146 U.S. 370 (1892). In Lewis, the defendant was required to use his peremptories from
a list of names, outside the presence of the prospective jurors. Id. at 375-76. On appeal, the Court
overturned his conviction. Id. at 380.
136. Id. at 376. For support, the Court cited Blackstone, who described the peremptory
challenge as "'a provision full of . . . tenderness and humanity to prisoners.'" Id. (quoting
BLACKSTONE, supra note 129, at 353); see supra note 132.
137. Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2358 (1992).
138. Id.
139. 429 U.S. 545 (1977).
140. Id. at 554 n.4.
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Finally, the Court considered the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a
trial by an impartial jury.'4' The Court noted that a challenge for cause exists,
which allows defendants to remove "those on the venire whom the defendant has
specific reason to believe" would be racist."4 Thus, the Court concluded that
"the exercise of a peremptory challenge must not be based on either the race of
the juror or the racial stereotypes held by the party." 43
What the Court ignored in its conclusion is that not all stereotypes are
inaccurate, and not all bias can be detected during voir dire. It is, indeed,
disturbing that our American heritage includes racism, and our society is often
divided along racial lines. However, because of this division, it is possible to
generalize with some accuracy about an individual's biases and predispositions
based on his or her race.'"
Furthermore, the Court's conclusion that a mechanism exists to remove bias
is of little help to the accused. First, potential jurors in a public setting are
unlikely to admit being prejudiced. " Second, even honest potential jurors
may not be aware of their own biases.'" Thus, the challenge for cause alone
will not assure a fair trial for the accused. What is required, and what the Court
has traditionally protected, is the criminal defendant's free use of the peremptory
challenge.
VI. CONCLUSION
In a strained effort to ease what the Court perceived as dissatisfaction with
141. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2358.
142. Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2359 (1992).
143. Id.
144. Goldwasser, supra note 92, at 837. In addition, Professor Goldwasser notes that some
studies have found that juror race may actually affect the outcome of a criminal trial. See, e.g.,
Sheri Lynn Johnson, Black Innocence and the White Jury, 83 MIcH. L. REV. 1611, 1625-31 (1985)
(showing that mock studies suggest that racial bias affects the determination of guilt). See also,
Denis Chimaeze E. Ugwuegbu, Racial and Evidential Factors in Juror Attribuion of Legal
Responsibility, 15 J. EXPEiMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 133 (1979) (concluding that defendants who
are of a different race from their jurors are considered by the jurors to be more culpable than those
in cases in which defendants and jurors are of the same race). See also, David A. Strauss, The Myth
of Colorblindness, 1986 SUP. CT. REV. 99.
145. See Thomas Colbert, Developments in the Law-Race and the Criminal Process, 101
HARv. L. REv. 1472, 1583 (1988). This is a reality that has been acknowledged by the courts, as
well. See, e.g., Coppedge v. United States, 272 F.2d 504, 508 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (noting that
prospective jurors were unlikely to admit being influenced by newspaper reports).
146. See Colbert, supra, note 145, at 1584. In addition, the Supreme Court recognized this
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our jury system, the majority in McColl=n twisted precedent to find state action.
In so doing, the Court ignored the reality of the antagonistic relationship
between the government and the accused. Instead, the majority dogmatically
asserted the ideal that prospective jurors should not be stereotyped on the basis
of skin color, no matter what cost this value judgment entails, or who -has to
bear it. Ultimately, the decision in McCollwn is wrong because the Court failed
to recognize that the right of criminal defendants to a fair trial, which the
unfettered use of the peremptory challenge secures, outweighs the equal
protection rights of prospective jurors.
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